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1
INTRODUCTION
Deforestation is an immense, complex and
multifaceted problem. Deforestation and forest
degradation are estimated to be responsible for
approximately fifteen percent of global emissions of
carbon dioxide (CO2).
1 The effective mitigation of
climate change through the stabilisation of atmospheric
greenhouse gas concentrations is unlikely without
addressing the problem of forest loss.2
The primary international response to deforestation
and land degradation has been the development of a
mechanism to incentivise better forest management.
The Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Land Degradation (REDD+) mechanism has been
the subject of intense negotiation and it has not yet
been finalised. The essence of the mechanism is
disarmingly simple: developed nations pay
developing nations to keep their forests standing and
well-managed. The carbon stored in these forests can
then be sold on international carbon markets or used
to offset other emissions.
Estimates of how much money can flow under this
mechanism have reached as high as US$30 billion.3
These funds can help improve forest management,
reduce emissions, support sustainable development, and
help to support biodiversity and ecosystem services.4
Forests are ‘crowded, complex and contested spaces’,5
where an array of voices compete to be heard in
decision-making processes that are often taking place
in distant places. The REDD+ mechanism will add
new voices and new complexities to forest
governance. A particular concern is the well-being
of the people that live in these forests – customary
land owners and Indigenous People – and the need
to ensure the recognition and protection of their
rights. Rosemary Lyster notes, ‘[o]ne of the crucial
questions which emerges in the context of REDD+
is how the rights of Indigenous People and local
communities will be protected’.6
The international aspects of negotiating a REDD+
mechanism have received considerable attention. Yet
even in the absence of a clear international
framework, implementation of REDD+ projects has
commenced. The new voices are already speaking
and threats to indigenous rights and customary land
tenure are already materialising. In this context, it is
important to consider the local ramifications of this
nascent international mechanism.
This paper aims to explore the interaction between
domestic legal frameworks implementing the
REDD+ mechanism and customary land ownership
by using the regulatory regime of Indonesia as a case
study. The paper will analyse the domestic legal framework
for land ownership, customary law and tenure,
forestry and REDD+ in Indonesia, assessing how
REDD+ projects interact with customary land
ownership and indigenous rights under this framework.
The paper will begin with a brief overview of the
REDD+ negotiations to date, including the
negotiating text emerging from the recent meeting
of the Conference of the Parties (hereafter COP) to
the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change 1992 (hereafter UNFCCC) in
Durban, South Africa (COP17). The paper will then
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1 The estimate was previously thought to be around 18-20
per cent but new data suggests the proportion is lower.
The figure of 12 per cent is applicable to forest loss; the
total figure of 15 per cent includes land degradation. See
G. van der Werf et al., ‘CO2 Emissions from Forest Loss’
2 Nature Geoscience 737 (2009).
2 See generally J. Eliasch, Climate Change: Financing Global
Forests (United Kingdom: Office of Climate Change, 2008).
3 Spokesperson for the Center for International Forestry
Research, quoted by Forest Carbon Asia, ‘REDD+
Potential Funds Reach Up to US$ 30 billion’, available
at www.forestcarbonasia.org/in-the-media/redd-
potential-funds-reach-up-to-us-30-billion/.
4 See, for example, D. Brown, F. Seymour and L. Peskett,
‘How Do We Achieve REDD Co-benefits and Avoid
Doing Harm?’, in A. Angelsen ed, Moving Ahead with
REDD: Issues, Options and Implications (Bogor, Indonesia:
Centre for International Forestry Research, 2008).
5 A. Babon, Power, Politics and Participation in Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
(REDD): A Case Study of Indonesia (Canberra, Australia:
Australian National University, Democratizing Climate
Governance, 15-16 July 2010) [hereafter ‘Babon’].
6 R. Lyster, ‘REDD+, Transparency, Participation and
Resource Rights: the Role of Law’ 14(2) Environmental
Science and Policy 118 (2010).
outline the ways in which REDD+ intersects with
Indigenous People and customary land ownership,
identifying Indigenous People as an essential
component of a successful REDD+ mechanism, but
also noting that REDD+ is a threat to Indigenous
People and their customary land rights. Two types
of threats will be discussed: the risk that Indigenous
People will be excluded from the REDD+ governance
process and the risks created by insecure tenure.
The key contribution of this paper is a detailed
analysis of the domestic legal framework for
REDD+ in Indonesia, exploring how the threats to
Indigenous People and customary land ownership
are entrenched at the domestic level. The paper
concludes that very little security of tenure is
provided to Indigenous People by Indonesia’s
domestic REDD+ legal framework and that this
shortcoming is likely to result in poor protection of
customary land rights under the REDD+
mechanism, regardless of the protection afforded by
an eventual international agreement. In short,
Indonesia’s domestic legal framework is wholly
inadequate to effectively implement REDD+ whilst
also protecting the rights of Indigenous People.
Furthermore, this paper concludes that while full
participation of Indigenous People is essential to an
equitable REDD+ scheme, Indigenous People are
unlikely to be protected unless land tenure reforms
are undertaken as a matter of priority to ensure
secure customary land tenure. Strong tenure must
be used as the basis for the interaction of Indigenous
People with the REDD+ mechanism.
2
REDD+
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation is broadly a mechanism which aims to
ascribe a financial value for stored carbon in the
world’s forests and offer incentives for developing
countries to reduce emissions from forested lands
and invest in low carbon paths to sustainable
development. The COP to the UNFCCC, at its 16th
meeting at Cancun, Mexico, stated that it:
Encourages developing country Parties to
contribute to mitigation actions in the forest
sector by undertaking the following activities,
as deemed appropriate by each Party and in
accordance with their respective capabilities and
national circumstances:
(a) Reducing emissions from deforestation;
(b) Reducing emissions from forest degradation;
(c) Conservation of forest carbon stocks;
(d) Sustainable management of forests;
(e) Enhancement of forest carbon stocks7
Activities (a) and (b) above are known as REDD
while the latter activities constitute the ‘plus’ in the
term REDD+. These activities and the proposed
mechanisms under which they will be undertaken
are both referred to as REDD+ in this paper.
2.1 From Bolivia to Durban
In January 1997, The Nature Conservancy and
Fundación Amigos de la Naturaleza and the
Government of Bolivia partnered with three energy
companies to implement what is generally considered
to be the world’s first REDD-style project,8 though
it would be another 10 years before this term is formalised
at COP13 to the UNFCCC in Bali, Indonesia.
REDD+ and Customary Land Rights in Indonesia
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7 The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the
Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative
Action under the Convention, Addendum Part Two:
Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its
sixteenth session, Decisions adopted by the Conference
of the Parties,  Report of the Conference of the Parties
on its sixteenth session, Cancun, November-December
2010, Doc. No. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 70 (2010).
8 V. Holloway and E. Giandomenico, The History of REDD
Policy 7 (Adelaide: Carbon Planet, 2009). The Noel Kempff
Mercado Climate Action Project aimed to protect 1.5
million hectares of forest under threat from degradation,
logging and agriculture. See The Nature Conservancy,
‘Combating Climate Change in Bolivia: Protecting Forests
to Reduce Global Warming: Noel Kempff Mercado Project
Snapshot’ (2007), available at http://conserveonline.org/
workspaces/climate.change/ClimateActionProjects/
NoelKempff/ProjectProfile/NKProfileEnglish.
The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC was adopted
in December 1997.9 Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol
states:
‘The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by
sources and removals by sinks resulting from
direct human-induced land-use change and
forestry activities… shall be used to meet the
[Kyoto commitments].’
Technical barriers relating to the verification of the
amount of carbon stored in forests led to the
restriction of REDD in the Marrakesh Accords
(COP7 in 2001).10 As the carbon stored in forest
could not be accurately verified, it was decided that
developed countries should be permitted to
undertake REDD activities to meet their targets, but
that only projects involving afforestation and
reforestation projects were to be permitted under
the Clean Development Mechanism.11
As the host of COP13 held in Bali in 2007, Indonesia
keenly pressed for a clear work programme to
resolve the outstanding issues that had previously
caused REDD to fall off the map.12 Decision 1/CP13
(Para 1 (b) (iii)) called for ‘[p]olicy approaches and
positive incentives on issues relating to [REDD+]”;
and the role of conservation [etc.]’.13
COP15 held in Copenhagen, Denmark in 2009 led
to the non-binding Copenhagen Accord, which
acknowledged the role of REDD+ in climate mitigation
and agreed on the need for the ‘immediate establishment
of a mechanism including REDD-plus’.14
The most current draft text emerged from the
Fourteenth Session of the Ad Hoc Working Group
on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention
(AWG-LCA) at COP 17 in Durban, South Africa in
2011.15 The Durban talks focused principally on
REDD+ financing, reference levels and safeguards.16
The current text notes the need to respect the rights
of Indigenous People and that their engagement is
necessary for effective action.17 Importantly, the
current text acknowledges the rights set out in the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples 2007 (hereafter UNDRIP).18
However, there are concerns that safeguards in the
current text are inadequate,19 and indigenous groups
continue to call for a moratorium on REDD+.20
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9 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, 10 December
1997, 37 ILM 22 (1998).
10 The Marrakech Accords, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2001/13/
Add.1-4 (2002). For a detailed analysis of the Marrakech
Accords, see M. Vespa, ‘Climate Change 2001: Kyoto at
Bonn and Marrakech’ 29 Ecology Law Quarterly 395 (2002).
11 IPCC, ‘Special Report of the Intergovermental Panel on
Climate Change on Land Use, Land Use Change and
Forestry’ (IPCC, 2000) and E. Trines, ‘Land-Use Change
and Forestry in Future Climate Regimes: An Inventory
of Some Options’ (The Netherlands: Ministry of
Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, 2004).
12 See Babon, note 5 above at 6.
13 The semi-colon in this passage was changed to a comma
by the 29th meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific
and Technical Advice (SBSTA) (Poznan, December 2008)
and marked the final transition REDD+ by putting
conservation and management (the ‘+’) on a level footing
with REDD activities.
14 Decision 2/CP.15 (Copenhagen Accord), Addendum
Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties
at its fifteenth session, Report of the Conference of the
Parties on its fifteenth session, Copenhagen, December
2009, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, 6.
15 AWG-LCA, ‘Amalgamation of draft texts in preparation
of a comprehensive and balanced outcome to be presented
to the Conference of the Parties for adoption at its
seventeenth session’, Durban, December 2011, UN Doc
FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/CRP.37.
16 See G. Silva-Chavez, ‘REDD+ Durban: Countries Agree
on Key Issues’ (Environmental Defense Fund, 2011),
available at http://blogs.edf.org/climatetalks/2011/12/
06/redd-durban-countries-agree-on-key-issues/.
17 AWG-LCA, ‘Amalgamation of draft texts’ (2011), note
15 above, para. 71.
18 UN General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2 October 2007, A/RES/
61/295, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/471355a82.html.
19 L. Aurora, ‘REDD+ Draft Texts Postpone Financing
Decision to 2012, Water Down Safeguards’ (Bogor,
Indonesia: CIFOR, 2001), available at http://
blog.cifor.org/5655/redd-draft-texts-postpone-financing-
decision-to-2012-water-down-safeguards/.
20 See Cultural Survival, ‘Indigenous Peoples Say No to
REDD+ and Durban Climate Agreement’ (Cambridge,
MA, USA: Cultural Survival, 2011), available at http://
www.culturalsurvival.org/news/none/indigenous-
peoples-say-no-redd-and-durban-climate-agreement and
World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the
Rights of Mother Earth, ‘Press release of the Global
Alliance of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities





REDD+, INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND
CUSTOMARY LAND OWNERSHIP
REDD+ intersects with customary land ownership
in two key ways. On the one hand, as much of the
forest land that will become part of REDD+ is
customarily owned or occupied, REDD+ will be
ineffective in the absence of the full participation of
customary land owners. On the other hand,
REDD+ may pose threats to customary land
ownership where insecure land tenure or inadequate
protection from state authority may make
Indigenous People vulnerable to dispossession. Care
must be taken to ensure that customary land owners
give their free, prior and informed consent to
decisions affecting their land, lest governments
‘cheat’ them out of the benefits that are rightfully
theirs. These two aspects of the intersection between
REDD+ and indigenous rights are outlined in the
following section.
3.1 Customary Land Owners:
Essential to REDD+ Effectiveness
The United Nations (hereafter UN) notes that
REDD+ will need the ‘full engagement and respect
for the rights of Indigenous Peoples and other forest-
dependent communities’,21 while the Chair of the
United Nations Permanent Forum of Indigenous
Issues notes that efficacious REDD+ will come to
fruition when Indigenous People are active
participants in decision making processes and are
allowed continued access to forests and their
resources.22
Much of the indigenous population of the world
already practise sustainable forestry as they have
historically relied on forestry resources for their
livelihoods. As one briefing paper notes, ‘[t]hrough
their age-old sustainable practices, Indigenous
Peoples have, in reality, been reducing emissions
from deforestation and forest degradation as a result
of sustainable forest and resource management
practices’.23 Traditional forest management
practices have led to the conservation of forests and
biological diversity. This conservation has
contributed to improved soil fertility, prevention
of soil erosion, an increase in vegetation cover, and
enhanced watershed development and protection.24
This knowledge, understanding and experience will
be crucial in ensuring that the REDD+ mechanism
actually works. Unfortunately, in its State of the
World’s Indigenous People Report, the UN notes
that to date ‘very few countries have included
considerations regarding forest-related traditional
knowledge in their forest policies’.25 This has led
to the marginalisation of Indigenous People in their
homelands, conflict and poor resource management.
In order to ensure that these mistakes are not
repeated with REDD+, indigenous involvement is
essential.
3.2 REDD+ as a Threat to Customary
Land Owners
Forestry law already faces ‘critical problems’ in
relation to Indigenous People, particularly the
overlapping of logging concessions with, and illegal
logging on, customary lands.26 REDD+ has the
potential to perpetuate many of these problems as
well as the potential to alleviate them.
In the move to earn income from keeping forests
standing, countries may exclude Indigenous People
from their customary forests; dispossess them
entirely; renew state control over the forests; exclude
REDD+ and Customary Land Rights in Indonesia
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21 See UN REDD Programme website, available at http://
w w w . u n - r e d d . c o m / A b o u t R E D D / t a b i d / 5 8 2 /
Default.html.
22 Id.
23 Asia Indigenous Peoples’ Pact and the International Work
Group for Indigenous Affairs, ‘REDD+ and Indigenous
Peoples: A Briefing Paper for Policy Makers’ (Chiang
Mai: Asia Indigenous Peoples’ Pact and the International
Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2010).
24 See Report of the Asia Summit on Climate Change and
Indigenous Peoples Summit, Bali, February 2009 (Baguio
City, Philippines: Tebtebba Foundation 2009).
25 United Nations Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples 90 (New
York: United Nations, 2009).
26 Id, Chapter 3.
1. UNDRIP must constitute a minimum
standard of protection for Indigenous
People;
2. Free, prior, informed consent is
fundamental to REDD+ governance; and
3. Traditional knowledge must be recognised.
International law has recognised the essential nature
of indigenous consultation and participation through
UNDRIP and its free, prior and informed consent
(hereafter FPIC) concept. Article 19 of UNDRIP
states:
‘States shall consult and cooperate in good faith
with the Indigenous Peoples concerned through
their own representative institutions in order
to obtain their free, prior and informed consent
before adopting and implementing legislative
or administrative measures that may affect
them.’
Article 32.2 pronounces:
‘States shall consult and cooperate in good faith
with the Indigenous Peoples concerned through
their own representative institutions in order
to obtain their free and informed consent prior
to the approval of any project affecting their
lands or territories and other resources…’
Clearly then, international law is moving towards
increased consent and cooperation, acknowledging
the rights of Indigenous People. While there is no
international agreement on REDD+, the principles
adopted by UNDRIP set the benchmark for the
protection of Indigenous People and they have been
included in the current text for REDD+. In assessing
Indonesia’s domestic legal framework for REDD+,
it will therefore be apposite to enquire as to whether
these standards have been met.
3.4 Tenure Security
Tenure security lies at the heart of the debates
surrounding REDD+ and customary land
ownership and it is of vital relevance and importance
to understand the relationship between REDD+ and
Indigenous People. Tenure security is widely
Indigenous People from decision-making; and, take
a top-down approach to forest governance.27
Recognising that REDD+ potentially threatens their
land, rights and livelihoods, the Indigenous Peoples
Global Summit on Climate Change adopted the
Anchorage Declaration, which calls for full and
effective participation of Indigenous Peoples in
REDD+ decision making and recognition of
indigenous self-determination. The Anchorage
Declaration states:
All initiatives under Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) must
secure the recognition and implementation of
the human rights of Indigenous Peoples,
including security of land tenure, ownership,
recognition of land title according to traditional
ways, uses and customary laws and the multiple
benefits of forests for climate, ecosystems, and
Peoples before taking any action.28
3.3 Participation in REDD+
Governance
The participation of Indigenous People in REDD+
governance processes is important to ensure that
they are not marginalised at the local level as a result
of the international climate change mitigation
process. The Indigenous Peoples’ Caucus at the
Bangkok meeting29 agreed on three key principles
to ensure that Indigenous People are not
marginalised by REDD+. There are:30
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27 See V. Tauli-Corpuz, ‘REDD Plus and Indigenous
Peoples: Opportunities and Risks’ (Rome: International
Fund for Agricultural Development, 2010).
28 The Anchorage Declaration, Indigenous Peoples Summit
on Global Summit on Climate Change (2009), available
at http://www.indigenoussummit.com/servlet/content/
declaration.html.
29 Seventh Session of the AWG-LCA, Bangkok, 28
September 2009.
30 International Forum on Globalisation, ‘Ensuring
Indigenous Peoples’ and Forest-Dependent Communities’
Rights in REDD (Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation), Strategy Session,
Summary Report and Recommendations’ (Washington
DC: International Forum on Globalization, 2009).
identified as one of the key factors in the success or
failure of REDD+; yet it may also be threatened by
moves to make money from forest carbon.31
The extensive literature regarding REDD+ identifies
many risks relating to insecure tenure and poor
protection of the rights of customary land owners
and occupiers. Indigenous People are vulnerable as
they have weaker bargaining position and less
influence over the REDD+ process, particularly in
relation to negotiations with governments.32 The
increased value of forests due to REDD+ can bring
large incomes for governments, which may in turn
become more controlling in order to secure this
income. Traditional ‘command and control’
measures could exclude Indigenous People from
forests and governance processes.
Poorly delineated and insufficiently protected tenure
will make it difficult to fairly and accurately
distribute the financial benefits accrued under the
REDD+ mechanism. There is a risk that Indigenous
People will not be compensated adequately for their
participation in REDD+ projects, the loss of their
traditional land, or even for the jobs lost in the forest
sector due to restrictions on forest use.33
The framework document of the UN-REDD
programme calls for support to promote the reform
of the land tenure system,34 and the 2001-2015 UN-
REDD Programme Strategy advocates the
integration of REDD+ into the broader sustainable
development agenda, including improving land
tenure systems.35
One extensive study into the relationship between
land tenure and REDD+ concluded that:
‘Effective local institutional capability, and the
knowledge and preparedness to put good forestry
into practice, will be essential for REDD…
effective and equitable local property rights are
needed.’36
Given these concerns, individual countries must be
assessed for their recognition of customary land
ownership and the protection of the accorded rights.
The case study outlines the arrangements for
customary ownership in Indonesia.
4
CASE STUDY: INDONESIA
Indonesia has the world’s fifteenth largest
economy,37 fourth largest population,38 and a land
area of about 1,904,569 million square kilometres,39
including around 100 million hectares of forest40.
In order to assess whether the domestic legal
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31 Note that insecure tenure itself is also a cause of
deforestation and degradation, clearing of land often being
a way to signify a claim of possession. See L. Cotula and J.
Mayers, ‘Tenure in REDD: Start-point or Afterthought?’
(London: IIED, 2009) [hereafter ‘Cotula and Mayers’] and
D. Sunderlin, M. Larson and P. Cronkleton, ‘Forest Tenure
Rights and REDD+: From Inertia to Policy Solutions’ in
A. Angelsened ed, Realising REDD+. National Strategy and
Policy Options (Bogor, Indonesia: CIFOR, 2009).
32 See Brown, Seymour and Peskett, note 4 above and
Cotula and Mayers, note 31 above.
33 A. Vatn and P. Vedeld, Getting Ready! A Study of
National Governance Structures for REDD+ (Aas,
Norway: Department of International Environment and
Development Studies, Norwegian University of Life
Sciences UMB, 2011).
34 FAO, UNDP and UNEP, ‘UN Collaborative
Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries:
framework document’ (2008), available at http://
www.unredd.net/index.php?option=com_docman
&task=doc_download&gid=4&Itemid=53.
35 UN-REDD, ‘The UN-REDD Programme Strategy 2011-
2015’ (Geneva: UN-REDD, 2011).
36 See Cotula and Mayers, note 31 above.
37 This is measured by GDP based on purchasing-power-
parity. See IMF, World Economic and Financial Surveys,
World Economic Outlook Database, available at http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/
index.aspx.
38 See CIA World Factbook, available at https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
rankorder/2119rank.html.
39 See CIA World Factbook, available at https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
rankorder/2147rank.html.
40 For a discussion on the calculation of Indonesia’s forest
resources, see A. Contreras-Hermosilla and C. Fay,
Strengthening Forest Management in Indonesia through
Land Tenure Reform: Issues and Framework for Action 2-
4 (Washington DC: Forest Trends, 2005).
framework in Indonesia will empower or marginalise
Indigenous People in the implementation of REDD+,
this section outlines the country’s legal history and
provides an analysis of customary land ownership
as well as discusses Indonesia’s land law, forestry law,
and laws relating specifically to REDD+.
Legal history is of interest due to the impact of
Indonesia’s colonial past on the present day legal
system, particularly with regard to the integration
of traditional and customary legal systems. Indonesia
has struggled to reconcile its colonial past with its
indigenous past and present. Land law and
customary ownership are of paramount importance
as they define the rights of customary owners and
therefore set the underlying framework for the
integration of REDD+ with the existing legal
system.
Forestry law is of interest because projects
undertaken under the auspices of the REDD+
mechanism are essentially a type of forestry project.
Both traditional forestry and REDD+ projects
involve payment for the utilisation of forest
resources: the resource in the former case are the
trees themselves whereas in the latter case, it is the
carbon they store. In both cases there is a risk that
inadequate legal protection for customary land
owners could threaten their rights and tenure.
Forestry law remains relevant even though Indonesia
has implemented specific REDD+ regulation.
Existing forestry law provides the foundation for
the entire regulatory system. Finally this section will
discuss Indonesia’s REDD+ laws.
4.1 Indonesian Law
Indonesian law is based on a civil law system
incorporating elements of customary law and Dutch
law. Prior to colonisation by the Dutch in the
sixteenth century, Indonesia was ruled by numerous
independent indigenous kingdoms, each with their
own customary laws. Following independence in
1945, Indonesia started to develop its present legal
system, infusing new laws with the precepts and
concepts of existing laws. As such, customary law
known as adat law remains a part of the modern
Indonesian legal system.
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4.1.1 Land Law
The development of land law in Indonesia is
inextricably linked to its colonial past. Prior to 1960,
land law was marked by dualism between the
colonial legal system, designed to meet the
capitalistic interests of the colonial government, and
the various customary systems. These customary
systems were not uniform in nature, though a
common thread was the notion that land was a
spiritual or social good and should be community-
owned rather than being conceptualised as an
economic commodity.41
The enactment of the Basic Agrarian Law (hereafter
BAL)42 was intended to bridge the gap between
‘Western’ law and customary law by providing for
registration of individual land rights while also
continuing to recognise customary land law concepts
and institutions. The preamble to the BAL states:
‘agrarian law is dualistic in nature, given that adat
(customary) law is also effective in addition to the
former [legal system], which is based on western
law’.
While Dutch land law inevitably favoured the
development of capital interests, independence
ushered in a different perspective. Article 33.3 of
the Constitution of Indonesia,43 which was
influential in guiding the underlying foundations of
BAL, states:
‘The land, the waters and the natural resources
within shall be under the powers of the State and
shall be used to the greatest benefit of the people.’
While Article 33.3 of the Constitution introduces a
more socialist perspective to Indonesian land law, it
125
41 E. Heryani and C. Grant, ‘Land Administration in
Indonesia’, 3rd FIG Regional Conference, Jakarta, 3-7
October 2004.
42 Indonesia, Undang-undang Pokok Agraria, Law Number
5 of 1960 [hereafter ‘BAL’]. Despite being called the Basic
Agrarian Law, BAL regulates all land.
43 Indonesia, The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of
Indonesia, As amended by the First Amendment of 1999,
the Second Amendment of 2000, the Third Amendment of
2001 and the Fourth Amendment of 2002, available at
http://www.embassyofindonesia.org/about/pdf/
IndonesianConstitution.pdf.
also introduces the ‘eminent domain’ concept
whereby the right to control land is vested in the
State. This means that customary land rights (ulayat)
are not guaranteed by BAL without further
clarification.
BAL created an array of categories of land rights,
including Hak Milik, which closely approximates to
the common law concept of freehold title, Hak Guna
Bangunan, which enables building on land, and
forestry rights (Memungut Hasil Hutan).
4.1.2 Customary Land Ownership
BAL was intended to be a system of land law based
on adat land law,44 and adat is mentioned several
times in BAL. For example, Article 2.4 states that
the State’s control over land ‘can be delegated… to
Autonomous Regions and to adat-law communities’.
However, while BAL provides general principles
recognising adat, BAL is ‘basic law’ and requires
implementing legislation to give substantive effect
to its provisions. Despite the fact that BAL has now
been in existence for over 45 years, only a handful
of implementing regulations have been introduced,
none relating to adat specifically. Without such
implementing regulations, ulayat occupies an
uncertain and unprotected position.
A People’s Assembly Decision regarding human
rights,45 and a Human Rights Act,46 professed to
recognise and protect adat communities and their
ulayat rights, which perhaps gives some cause for
hope. Unfortunately, Indonesian forestry legislation
passed shortly after the Human Rights Act disregards
this recognition, compounding previous failures to
protect ulayat rights in the forestry context.
4.1.3 Forestry Law
A number of sector-specific legislation and
regulations followed BAL. These include the
Forestry Act 1967 (hereafter the 1967 Act),47 and
an implementing regulation,48 as well as legislation
regarding mining and other land activities. The 1967
Act was subsequently deemed to ‘no longer [be]
compatible with the principles of forest control and
administration and with current development’,49
and was replaced by a new Forestry Act in 1999.50
Far from clarifying and protecting ulayat rights, the
1967 Act and the New Forestry Act have further
marginalised adat communities. The 1967 Act was
intended to improve economic growth and stimulate
development through the exploitation of Indonesia’s
abundant forest resources. The 1967 Act increased
exploitation and facilitated the issuance of large
forestry concessions to corporations: in its wake,
income from logging increased by up to 2,800
percent. In 1967, four million cubic meters of timber
were extracted, the majority for domestic use, but
ten years later this had increased to 28 million cubic
meters, a majority of which was exported.51
As the 1967 Act has been subsumed by the New
Forestry Act, it is the latter that will be discussed
here. However, the New Forestry Act takes more
or less the same position as the 1967 Act in relation
to ulayat rights in forests; neither does much to
recognise or protect ulayat rights. The New Forestry
Act splits forest ownership into two categories: state
and proprietary. State Forest is defined by Article
1.4 simply as ‘forest located on lands bearing no
ownership rights’ while Article 1.5 defines
Proprietary Forest as ‘forest situated on a piece of
land covered by proprietary rights’, such as those
mentioned above.
The New Forestry Act confirms that forests
formerly controlled by adat law communities are
included in the ‘State Forest’ category. This means
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that adat communities do not own or control the
forests in which they live. Using the ‘eminent
domain’ concept, the New Forestry Act defines Adat
forest as ‘State Forest situated in the territory of adat
community’.52
Article 37 states, in relation to adat forest, that:
1. Utilisation of “adat” forest shall be undertaken
by concerned customary communities, in
accordance with the forest’s function.
2. Utilisation of “adat” forest with protection
and conservation functions shall be
undertaken as long as it does not disturb
those functions.
Article 6 declares that forests have three functions:
conservation, protection, and production. The State
is empowered to classify forests according to these
functions. It is at this point that the significance of
land and forestry laws in relation to customary ownership
in the context of REDD+ becomes apparent.
Under the New Forestry Act, if the State wishes to
set up a REDD+ project, it can designate swathes
of State forest as ‘protection forest’ or ‘conservation
forest’ under Article 6. Customary land occupiers
will then be unable to: (1) utilise their traditional
lands insofar as this utilisation may conflict with the
REDD+ project, and (2) implement REDD+
themselves as they have no ownership rights over
the forest which they occupy.
Given the potential for disenfranchisement of
Indigenous People under Indonesian land and
forestry laws, it is hoped that a specific REDD+
regulation is implemented to ensure the rights of
Indigenous forest-dwellers.
4.1.4 REDD+ Law
Indonesia has been one of the ‘first off the block’ in
establishing specific laws regarding REDD+.
Indonesia’s swift establishment of specific REDD+
laws is perhaps unsurprising. In 1967, Indonesia
scrambled to unsustainably chop down its forests
to generate income, yet REDD+ enables countries
to generate income by doing precisely the opposite.
It is therefore understandable that Indonesia and
other forested nations want to facilitate the rapid
uptake of REDD+ projects.
However, laws established in such a reactionary
manner are likely to be inadequate and defective. For
the present purpose, the key question is whether
Indonesia’s REDD+ laws and regulations address the
two problems set out in the previous paragraph: (1)
does Indonesia’s REDD+ framework protect
customary occupiers?; and (2) does it allow them to
partake in REDD+ governance and implementation?
REDD+ laws in Indonesia consist of two regulations
and one decree issued by the Ministry of Forestry.
These are:
• Regulation No. 68 of 2008 on
Demonstration Activities of REDD
(hereafter the Demonstration Regulation);
• Regulation No. 30 of 2009 on the
Implementation Procedures of Reducing
Emission from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation (hereafter the Implementation
Regulation); and
• Decree No. 36 of 2009 on Procedures for
Licensing of Commercial Utilisation of
Carbon Sequestration and/or Storage in
Production and Protected Forests
(hereafter the Licensing Decree).
The Demonstration Regulation provides for five
year demonstration projects to be implemented by
‘proponents’ (that is, government, forest timber
license holders, holders and managers of right forests,
managers of customary forest) who can be assisted
by ‘partners’ (government, international
organisations, private entities, individuals), with the
aim of testing and developing methodologies,
technology and institutions.53
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projects. Even if this were to be changed in light of
future international developments, the Implementation
Regulation currently requires the implementer to
prove a legal connection to the forest that is to be the
subject of a REDD+ project,57 a condition that
traditional custodians of the forest will be unable to
satisfy due to the lack of recognition of their
customary property rights. This is clearly contrary
to Article 29.1 of the UNDRIP, which states:
‘Indigenous peoples have the right to the
conservation and protection of the environment
and the productive capacity of their lands or
territories and resources.’
The one area where there is some hope is the
Licensing Decree which stipulates that 70 percent
of the income from REDD+ projects in Hutan Adat
(Customary Forest) is to be allocated to the
community, while 10 percent and 20 percent will
be distributed to the Government and the developer
respectively.58 This is indubitably a step in the right
direction though the strong nature of the Decree
must be followed up with strong adherence and
enforcement. Whether this is likely to occur is
questionable. Furthermore, without strong
customary land tenure, it may be difficult to
determine who the community actually is, risking
placing the financial benefits in the hands of local
elites and officials rather than the community as a
whole.
4.2 The Framework in Practice: the
Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon
Partnership
The Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon Partnership
was established in June 2008. Initially Australia
committed AU$40 million to assist Indonesia in
developing its participation in REDD+, which
incorporated AU$30 million for the Kalimantan
Forests and Climate Partnership demonstration
activity and a bilateral package of AU$10 million
supporting capacity building relating to the technical
The Implementation Regulation is a more
substantive regulation dealing with REDD+ projects
of 30 years’ duration. It allows national and
international entities54 to be ‘REDD implementers’.
The implementer holds the right to trade the carbon
credits created by REDD+ activities. The
Implementation Regulation allows flexibility for the
system to be changed to align with any future
international agreement on REDD+.55
The Demonstration Regulation and the
Implementation Regulation define REDD+ projects
as an ‘environmental service’, the exploitation of
which requires a licence. The Licensing Decree sets
out the detail of these licences and how carbon
credits are to be marketed, including provisions
relating to the verification of emissions reduction.
Most significantly for the present purpose, the
Licensing Decree also details how the monetary
income from REDD+ projects is to be distributed
in relation to different types of forests.56
4.1.4.1 Adat Communities in the REDD+
Decrees
Just as the international draft text on REDD+ has
failed to strongly assert the rights of Indigenous
People, the Indonesian REDD+ regulations and
decrees have paid scant attention to the involvement
of adat communities in the REDD+ process.
The Implementation Regulation stipulates that
REDD+ projects taking place on customarily
occupied forest land require a recommendation from
the regional government authorities. While this has
the potential to offer some protection to customary
occupiers, in reality the local level government
authorities will often be subject to the same
influences and drivers as those at the national level.
The Implementation Regulation also bars customary
occupiers of forests from developing REDD+
projects themselves. Only regional, national and
international entities are allowed to implement
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aspects of implementing REDD+.59 The figure now
is approximately AU$100 million.60
The Kalimantan Forests and Climate Partnership is
the first large-scale REDD+ demonstration project
in Indonesia, implementing REDD+ on 120,000
hectares of forested and degraded tropical peatland
in Central Kalimantan, Borneo. Encouragingly the
project allows for ‘incentive based payments for
forest-dependent communities’.61 However, besides
a simple factsheet produced by AusAID, detailed
documentation relating to the project is unavailable.
A Friends of the Earth report analysed
documentation for the project and found that ‘[n]one
of the Kalimantan documents mention the necessity
of recognising rights of local peoples, and
particularly [FPIC]’.62 Of course, it is arguable that
it is not the role of Australia to protect Indonesia’s
Indigenous People and that it is for domestic law to
play this role in REDD+. Unfortunately, as has been
seen, domestic law is not doing this effectively.
The Kalimantan project is aiming to develop legally
enforceable rights to sequestered carbon based on
Indonesian forestry law.63 Again this is problematic
as domestic law is not effectively protecting
indigenous rights. As one NGO put it:
‘since [Indonesian forestry law] fails to protect
the rights of indigenous communities…
Australia’s funding for REDD means support
for the continuation of an unjust forest
management regime which has systematically
marginalised forest communities and violated
their rights to land and resources.’ 64
This paper began by noting the complexity of forests
and the Central Kalimantan region is a prime
example. Through a diverse local history - Dutch
colonisation, open access to customary land,
Suharto’s ‘Mega Rice’ projects, and now REDD+ -
Central Kalimantan has become a hotbed of power
struggles and competing claims over rights to forests
and their carbon, all compounded by a lack of legal
clarity.65
Against this background, REDD-Monitor, an
independent blog monitoring REDD+ projects
worldwide, received two statements from a local
group in relation to the project. The first stated that
Indigenous People in the area were against the
project,66 while the second, sent only a month later
by the same group, retracted the earlier statement
simply saying it was ‘not true’.67 This may seem
strange, perhaps a little amusing, but it highlights
the complexities of forests. It is thought that the first
letter was driven by an Australian NGO and the
second by the Kalimantan project managers.
In June 2011, the Central Kalimantan Chapter of
the Indigenous People Alliance of the Archipelago
issued a ‘Statement of Concern’ (which, as yet, has
not been retracted) calling for a moratorium on
REDD+ projects.68 The Statement expressed
concern about many aspects of REDD+ projects in
the region including: lack of transparency; complete
ignorance of FPIC; lack of involvement in decision-
making; poor governance and weak state capacity
in the region; and conflict between national,
provincial and local regulations and authorities.69
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There is a bitter irony here: Norway and Indonesia
agreed on a moratorium on logging as part of a
separate REDD+ deal;70 now Indigenous People are
demanding the same for REDD+.
4.3 Customary Ownership and
REDD+ in Indonesia: An Assessment
The United Nations Committee on Racial
Discrimination has written to the Indonesian
Government to express concerns that the REDD+
regulations do not respect the rights of Indigenous
People,71 and overall, this appears to be a fair
assessment. While the Licensing Decree suggests that
money may flow to customary occupiers of forests,
there remains uncertainty of tenure, a lack of
consultation and an all-round lack of recognition and
protection of the rights of Indigenous People.
The Australian REDD+ project confirms that the
rushed nature of the REDD+ regulations and the
weak nature of land and forestry law and governance
are a threat to customary land ownership. Thorough
and comprehensive education, consultation and
participation are required if REDD+ projects are
to be legitimate and are to be seen as being legitimate.
Indigenous People’s rights to their land must be
protected and not treated as either an unfortunate
inconvenience or a campaigning tool.
In addition, Freedom House states: ‘corruption,
collusion, and nepotism continue to constitute the
modus operandi of Indonesian politics’ despite some
improvements over recent years.72 This is likely to
pose a huge challenge to the legitimacy of any
REDD+ project. If governance arrangements for
REDD+ are to be transparent with a high level of
accountability and participation, corruption must
be curtailed. A combination of weak legal protection
and corrupt enforcement may well sound the death
knell for customary land rights over forests in
regions earmarked for REDD+ projects.
5
MAKING REDD+ WORK FOR
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE: LESSONS
LEARNED
The first key lesson to be learned from the analysis
of the legal framework for REDD+ in Indonesia is
that outlining the protection for customary land
owners in a REDD+ mechanism at the international
level will be meaningless without equally strong
rights at the domestic level, both nationally and
locally. The problems with Australia’s REDD+
project in Indonesia suggest that in the absence of
robust domestic laws, REDD+ is likely to add a
further layer of complexity and confusion to an
already contested and sensitive space without
bringing real benefits to any of the key stakeholders.
The second key lesson is that the most crucial
reforms are land tenure reforms. Secure tenure must
be seen as a prerequisite to effective REDD+ that is
sensitive to indigenous rights. Indonesia’s lack of
recognition of customary land rights and
concomitant weak legal protection makes it difficult
to imagine how the other necessary protections such
as participation in governance and sharing the
monetary benefits will be achieved. Without security
of tenure, Indigenous People will have to rely on
domestic authorities and foreign governments to
protect their interests. This leaves Indigenous People
in a precarious situation as the interests of those
actors are not generally aligned with their own.
A comprehensive study of land tenure and REDD+
in general, mentioned previously, concluded that
land tenure should be the foundation of REDD+.73
The need to prioritise land tenure reform is borne
out by the analysis in this paper.
REDD+ and Customary Land Rights in Indonesia
130
70 See ‘Norway-Indonesia REDD+ Partnership - Frequently
Asked Questions’, available at www.norway.or.id/
Norway_in_Indonesia/Environment/-FAQ-Norway-
Indonesia-REDD-Partnership-.
71 ‘Indonesia: REDD Project – Many Threats, No Solution’,
153 World Rainforest Movement Bulletin (2010).
72 ‘Country Report – Indonesia’, in Freedom House,
Countries at the Crossroads 2010 1-2 (Washington DC:
Freedom House, 2010). 73 See Cotula and Mayers, note 31 above.
Third, specific regulations must be adopted that
detail not only the ‘commercial’ side of a REDD+
project but also address how FPIC is to be obtained,
how Indigenous People will participate in REDD+,
and how the financial benefits will reach them. As
Indonesia’s REDD+ regulations show, it is not
sufficient to rapidly promulgate laws that lack
substance to ensure that REDD+ is both effective
and equitable.
The fourth lesson learned is that the strength of
underlying governance is crucial to ensure that
customary land rights are protected under a REDD+
mechanism. Improvements in land tenure security
and REDD+ regulation are unlikely to be enough
to achieve effective REDD+ and fairness for
customary land owners and occupiers if they are
undermined by widespread corruption and poor
governance. While this issue is beyond the scope of
this paper, it is a pressing one in many areas of
environmental governance and it must be addressed.
A final consideration relates to strategies for
improving the interaction between REDD+ and
Indigenous People. Given that the interests of
Indigenous People are not aligned with those of the
actors implementing REDD+ and that corruption
and poor governance is widespread, it may be
questioned whether and how the interaction can be
improved. As Cotula and Mayers note, tackling some
of the ‘powerful players behind deforesting
activities’, including corporations, self-interested
foreign and local governments and corrupt officials,
‘will require concerted action on an unprecedented
scale’.74
Developed countries have a responsibility, enshrined
in international climate change law as the concept
of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, to
bear a greater share of the burden for mitigating
climate change. It is simply not acceptable for a
developed nation to defer to the national authorities
of developing countries in the protection of
Indigenous People under a REDD+ mechanism.
While this paper does not advocate that developed
countries should dictate domestic laws in developing
countries, it is submitted that developed countries
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seeking to take advantage of the REDD+
mechanism owe a duty to ensure that they do not
finance REDD+ projects until adequate safeguards
are in place to ensure that REDD+ will not prejudice
Indigenous People.
As a starting point, developed countries must rethink
their aid and investment strategy. Before
implementing REDD+ projects, they must shift
their focus to improving tenure security, increasing
participation, strengthening governance, and
eradicating corruption. Only then can REDD+ be
both effective and sensitive to the interests of
Indigenous People and their customary land
ownership rights.
74 Id, at vi.
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